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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OREM CITY,
:

CaseNo.20041087-CA

:

(not incarcerated)

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
BRAD HAROLD MASSEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this
misdemeanor appeal.
ISSUE. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
Do the trial court's failure to inform Massey of his right to counsel, and failure to
obtain a waiver of that right prior to Massey's bench trial, require a new trial?
Because the trial court made no relevant findings of fact, this issue presents a
question of law, to be reviewed without deference, for correctness. See, e.g.. State v.
Bvington. 936 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1997).
This issue was preserved by the motion for a new trial filed by counsel whom
Massey retained after he was convicted in his pro se trial (R. 19).
Regardless of whether the issue was fully preserved, this Court should reverse the
conviction under the plain error and exceptional circumstances doctrines, discussed infra.
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE
The controlling constitutional provisions, statutes and rule are copied in the
addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The City charged Massey with one count of reckless driving, a Class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (R. 1).
At the arraignment, Judge Backlund informed Massey of the charge, took a plea of
not guilty and gave him a trial date (T. 9/29/2004 at 2).
Mr. Massey represented himself at a bench trial before Judge Backlund (R. 7-8).
The court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to probation (R. 7-8).
Through counsel, Massey moved for a new trial, presenting newly discovered
evidence - an eyewitness to the driving pattern, who opined that Massey was not driving
recklessly (R. 10-22). The motion for a new trial also argued that Massey should have
had counsel during the first trial (R. 19). The court denied the motion "on the basis of
unsubstantial evidence." (R. 27).
Massey filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 29).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Justin Sprague, a Utah Valley State College Police officer, stopped a silver
Porches 911 Turbo being driven by Massey (R. 47 at 3-4). He estimated that the car was
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going over 100 miles an hour on 1-15, where the limit is 65 (R. 47 at 4). He claimed
Massey changed lanes without signaling, and did not stay in a lane for three seconds
before changing (R. 47 at 5). He could not catch Massey until Massey slowed and took
the off ramp (R. 47 at 5). Sprague told Massey he had been going over 100 miles an
hour, and Massey did not deny it, but did explain that he had been working on the car and
was driving so fast to get an air bubble out of "the line." (R. 47 at 6).
Massey testified that he was speeding, but that he only changed one lane and
signaled before turning (R. 47 at 8). He guessed he was going eighty eight miles an hour
(R. 47 at 9).
Massey was convicted of reckless driving in a bench trial (R. 7-8).
At the arraignment and at the trial, the court never informed Massey of his right to
counsel, or obtained a waiver of that right (T. 9/24/2004 at 2, R. 47 at 3-36).
Following the bench trial, Massey retained counsel, who argued that Massey
should have had counsel during the first trial (R. 19).
The trial court interpreted this argument as an insult and rejected it out of hand,
stating:
You act like if someone comes in here for a speeding trial, they are
automatically convicted if they don't have Counsel. Thank you for
denigrating the Court. Don't you think I listen to the evidence before I
render a verdict on both sides?
(R. 61 at 9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
3

In failing to inform Massey of his right to counsel, and in failing to obtain a proper
waiver of that right, the trial court violated the constitutions, Utah Code, and the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Because the findings that should have been made regarding the waiver cannot be
made post hoc, a new trial is required.
ARGUMENT
The right to counsel in criminal cases is provided by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and by Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution. See, e.g.,
Webster v. Jones,
587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah, 1978). The right to counsel in criminal cases is also secured by
the Due Process Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. See, e.g.. State v.
Spiers, 361 P.2d 509, 510 (Utah 1961). The right to counsel in criminal cases is also
recognized in the Utah Code, § 77-l-6(l)(a).
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require magistrates to inform criminal
defendants of their rights to retained or appointed counsel, see Utah R. Crim. P. 7(e)(3),
and require magistrates to appoint counsel in cases wherein the criminal defendants are
indigent and face a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty. See Utah R. Crim. 8(a).
When criminal defendants proceed pro se, due process requires trial courts to
insure that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to
counsel. Spiers, supra, at 510; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Trial courts
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are supposed to evaluate all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the
accused's conduct, background and experience. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458,
464(1938).
In Utah, trial court are supposed to conduct an in-depth on-the-record colloquy to
assess whether the defendant understands the risks he undertakes in waiving the right to
counsel, and is able to make a knowing and voluntary choice in waiving counsel. State v.
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). Suggested areas of inquiry include "whether
defendant has studied law; defendant's experience at self-representation; the charges and
possible penalties faced; familiarity with, and the expectation of adherence to, procedural
and evidentiary rules; a warning that the trial court will not direct or advise the defense; a
recommendation against self-representation; and whether the choice of self-representation
is voluntary. Finally, appointment of standby counsel should be considered." State v.
DrobeL 815 P.2d 724, 732 (Utah App. 1991).
Utah law recognizes that when a criminal defendant represents himself at trial in
the absence of a proper inquiry into the extent of the knowing and voluntary nature of the
waiver, reversal is required, because trial courts cannot make the necessary findings post
hoc. See, State v. Bakalov. 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993).
In Bakalov, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and failed to conduct a
proper colloquy before repeatedly refusing Mr. Bakalov's efforts to waive his right to
counsel. The court of appeals remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration
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under the proper legal standard, of whether Bakalov could have waived his rights to
counsel. See icL,862 P.2d at 1355, and Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 635-37 (Utah App. 1993).
The supreme court reversed, agreeing with Judge Greenwood, who stated in her opinion
for the Court of Appeals:
The circumstances existing prior to Dr. Bakalov's trial cannot be recreated.
... [T]he trial court never advised Dr. Bakalov of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation and thus could not then or now assess
his responses to that advice.
862 P.2d at 1355, quoting Bakalov, 849 P.2d at 637.
In the instant matter, the trial court never informed Massey of his right to counsel,
never conducted a proper colloquy, never obtained a waiver of the right to counsel, and
never made any of the findings necessary to the waiver that never occurred. This violated
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Constitution of
Utah, Article I §§ 7 and 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6, and Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure 7 and 8, supra. The error cannot be corrected by the entry of post hoc findings.
See Bakalov, supra.
There is a reasonable likelihood of a different result in the absence of Massey's
pro se representation, because the evidence was an evenly balanced credibility contest
before the motion for a new trial. See Statement of Facts. A defense attorney may well
have been able to obtain a lesser conviction for speeding, or a plea bargain to some other
lesser offense.
It appears that this type of error is viewed as structural in any event, given the
6
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Bakalov court's finding of harmful error without any evidentiary analysis whatsoever, see
jd., 862 P.2d 1355, and given the well-established law recognizing that prejudice is
presumed in cases wherein counsel is denied. See, e.g.. State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,
442 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).
Particularly because Massey was never informed of his right to counsel, there is
nothing upon which to predicate or hypothecate a waiver. See also, Kuehnert v Turner,
499 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Utah 1972) (in reversing sentence because counsel was not
present, the court stated, "since plaintiff was not informed of his right to the presence of
counsel, there is no ground upon which to predicate a waiver of this right.").
Accordingly, reversal of the conviction is in order. See id.
To the extent that trial counsel's motion for a new trial did not fully preserve this
issue, this Court should reach the merits of the issue under the exceptional circumstances
and/or plain error doctrines.
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29,123, 94 P.3d 186.
The application of this doctrine would be appropriate here, where Massey was
wholly deprived and uninformed regarding his right to counsel, and where the trial court
had no appreciation for the right to counsel, and was personally affronted by the
suggestion that Massey should have had counsel in the bench trial (R. 61 at 9).
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The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are
particularly appropriate for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United
States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.\ cert, denied. 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999).
The law requiring the trial court to inform Massey of his right to counsel, and to
obtain a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel prior to the pro se trial
has been black letter law in Utah for years. See, e.g.. Frampton. supra. The trial court's
error in this regard was obvious, and was prejudicial as explained above, assuming
arguendo that prejudice need be shown. But see Strickland, supra (prejudice is presumed
in cases wherein counsel is denied).
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Massey's conviction and remand the matter for a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted this ^

day of IrWgyyjh \

^r&J&A
D. Gilbert Athay
Counsel for Mr. Massey
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing, first
class postage pre-paid to: the Utah County Attorney's Office, 97 East Center Street,
Orem, Utah 84057, this
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ADDENDUM
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Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
2. (a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense
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is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the
costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his
wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an
infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant shall appear
before the court as directed in the summons.

(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without a warrant, the
person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. If an
information has not been filed, one shall be filed without delay before the magistrate
having jurisdiction over the offense.

(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as is reasonably
feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a determination shall be
made as to whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee. The

determination may be made by any magistrate, although if the arrestee is charged with a
capital offense, the magistrate may not be a justice court judge. The arrestee need not be
present at the probable cause determination.

(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magistrate, although
the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or otherwise
electronically transmitted to the magistrate.

(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be reduced to a
sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause issue to the magistrate for
decision. The person reading the statement to the magistrate shall verify to the magistrate
that the person is reading the written statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement
that person's name and title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate,
and the determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement.

(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or otherwise
electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as practicable, be filed
with the court where the case will be filed.

(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it determine
whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee.

(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to detain the
arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the arrestee.

(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee, the
magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The bail determination shall
coincide with the recommended bail amount in the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the
magistrate finds substantial cause to deviate from the Schedule.

(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the Justice Court
Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures availability of magistrates
consistent with the need in that particular district. The schedule shall take into account the
case load of each of the magistrates, their location and their willingness to serve.
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(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplishment of other
procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to in paragraph (c)(1) above.

(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was committed the
person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county where the crime
was committed and shall be taken before the proper magistrate under these rules.

(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to the county and
the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail
may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the person arrested may
state in writing a desire to forfeit bail, waive trial in the district in which the information
is pending, and consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the person was
arrested, is held, or is present.

(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in which the
information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or copies of them to the
clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The
prosecution shall continue in that county.

(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the warrant.

(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor for which a
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1),
the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the
county of arrest for the determination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail
or held without bail under Section 77-20-1.

(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense, with
the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate.

(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon the defendant's
first appearance, inform the defendant:

(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy;

(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how
to obtain them;

(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court without
expense if unable to obtain counsel;

(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and

(e)(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the statements the
defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a court of law.

(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph (e) and before
proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult
counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney by any reasonable means,
without delay and without fee.

(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate shall call upon
the defendant to enter a plea.

(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided
by law.

(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be extended
except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules and law applicable to
criminal cases.

(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised of the right
to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to a preliminary
examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the
defendant bound over to answer in the district court.
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(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall
schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be held within a reasonable
time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for the offense charged and
not later than 30 days if the defendant is not in custody. These time periods may be
extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be
held if the defendant is indicted.

(I)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under the rules
and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of
proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the
defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant
may also cross-examine adverse witnesses.

(I)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall
order that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of
probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the
preliminary examination.

(I)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has
been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either party, may
exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses not to converse with
each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party,
the magistrate may order all spectators to be excluded from the courtroom.

(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court, the
magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk of the
district court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings before the magistrate,
including exhibits, recordings, and any typewritten transcript.
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(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, the magistrate
shall execute the appropriate commitment order.

(I)(l) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness in a pending
case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the magistrate may fix a bond
with or without sureties and in a sum considered adequate for the appearance of the witness.

(1)(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the court, the
magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies or is otherwise
legally discharged.

(1)(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be examined and
cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the defendant and the testimony
shall be recorded. The witness shall then be discharged.

(1)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent hearing or trial
when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at the hearing or trial in lieu
of the personal testimony of the witness.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8
(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self representation, and if
indigent, has the right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces a substantial
probability of deprivation of liberty.

(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant who is
charged with an offense for which the punishment may be death, the court shall appoint
two or more attorneys to represent such defendant and shall make a finding on the record
based on the requirements set forth below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial
of capital cases. In making its determination, the court shall ensure that the experience of
counsel who are under consideration for appointment have met the following minimum requirements

(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to verdict six felony cases
within the past four years or twenty-five felony cases total;
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(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in
a capital or a felony homicide case which was tried to a jury and which went to final verdict;

(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed or taught within the past
five years an approved continuing legal education course or courses at least eight hours of
which deal, in substantial part, with the trial of death penalty cases; and

(4) the experience of one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five years in
the active practice of law.

(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a capital case, the court should
also consider at least the following factors:

(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration have previously appeared as
counsel or co-counsel in a capital case;

(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have sufficient time and support
and can dedicate those resources to the representation of the defendant in the capital case
now pending before the court with undivided loyalty to the defendant;

(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have engaged in the active
practice of criminal law in the past five years;

(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being considered; and

(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to be appointed
will fairly, efficiently and effectively provide representation to the defendant.

(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to death, the court shall appoint
one or more attorneys to represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding that
counsel is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be found proficient to represent on

000070

appeal persons sentenced to death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys
must meet the following requirements:

(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least three felony appeals; and

(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past five years an
approved continuing legal education course which deals, in substantial part, with the trial
or appeal of death penalty cases.

(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent petitioner pursuant
to
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(a). the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to
represent such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on post-conviction appeal and shall
make a finding that counsel is qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in postconviction cases. To be found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed
attorneys must meet the following requirements:

(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at least three
felony or post-conviction appeals;

(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in
a post-conviction case at the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation;

(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended and completed or taught
within the past five years an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in
substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty cases or with the prosecution or
defense of post-conviction proceedings in death penalty cases;

(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to judgment or verdict three
civil jury or felony cases within the past four years or ten cases total; and

(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five

years in the active practice of law.

(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this
rule shall not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal.

(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid as described in Chapter 32
of Title 77.

(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be paid pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. $ 78-35a-202f2Yc).
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Because defendant works solely with and around vehicles, he

2

cannot have a moving violation conviction on his record."

3

I wonder about that.

If that's true, why would he

4

I mean, even he admits he was going 8 8 miles an hour on the

5

freeway.

6

Isn't that really his responsibility?
Then it says, "In other words, Officer Sprague's

7

unjustified and completely unsubstantiated charge of reckless

8

driving has ruined the defendant's professional life.

9

snap of an officer's overzealous ticket book, defendant went

In the

10

from being a successful mechanic to being unemployed, and a

11

poster boy for vocational rehabilitation."

12

that paragraph is a little over the top?

Don't you think

13

MR. JARDINE: It may well be, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: I think so, Counsel.

15

MR. JARDINE: And I do apologize to the Court

16

THE COURT: I mean, "In the snap of an officer's

17

—

—

overzealous ticket book"?

18

MR. JARDINE: Your Honor, if I may

19

THE COURT: When I read things like that, I'm offended.

20

MR. JARDINE: And I do apol

21

THE COURT: You act like if someone comes in here for a

—

—

22

speeding trial, they are automatically convicted if they don't

23

have Counsel.

24

think I listen to the evidence before I render a verdict on

25

both sides?

Thank you for denigrating the Court.

Don't you
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